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RIGHT OF A SovIEr CORPORATION TO SUE
THE UNITED STATES
JUST prior to the fall of the Czarist government two cargo steamers were
being built in a New York shipyard on contract with the Russian Volun-
teer Fleet, an organization established in 1877 under the laws of the
Empire. After America's entrance into the World War and while the
Kerensky Provisional Government, enjoying American diplomatic recogni-
tion, was yet in power, the uncompleted ships with the contracts for their
construction were requisitioned for war purposes by the President through
the Emergency Fleet Corporation. Following the Bolshevist revolution
the Fleet sued to recover the fair value of the contracts in accordance
with the terms of the act by which they had been taken,1 its counsel in-
timating that it was a citizen of Soviet Russia.2 The case thus presents
the question of the right of a Soviet corporation to sue in the courts of
this country.
The Court of Claims, dismissing the complaint for lack of jurisdiction,
held the plaintiff's rights to be qualified by Section 155 of the Judicial
Code which makes it necessary for an alien who sues the United States to
show that reciprocal privileges of suit are granted to Americans by the
foreign government. 3 It held further that evidence of such reciprocity
would not be received in the absence of recognition of the Soviet gov-
ernment by the Department of State.4 The Supreme Court reversed this
judgments5 on the theory that Section 155 applies only to contractual
actions, whereas the principal case arose from appropriation by right of
eminent domain with special statutory provision for componsation.0 It
was held that to read conditions of reciprocity and recognition into the
'Whenever the United States shall . . . requisition any contract . . .
[or] ship . . . in accordance with the provisions hereof, it shall make just
compensation therefor . :. and if the amount thereof ... is unsatisfactory
to the person entitled to receive the same, such person shall be paid seventy-
five per centum of the amount .. . and shall be entitled to sue the United
States to recover such further sum . ., as will be just compensation there-
for, in the manner provided by . . . section one hundred and forty-five of
the Judicial Code." 40 STAT. 183 (1917). Section 145 of the Judicial Code
gives jurisdiction to the Court of Claims in actions against the United
States founded on laws of Congress. 36 STAT. 1136 (1911), 28 U. S. C. A.
§ 250 (1) (1928).
2 Russian Volunteer Fleet v. United States, 68 Ct. C1. 32, 33 (1929).
3 Russian Volunteer Fleet v. United States, supra note 2, at 33, 35.
Section 155 of the Judicial Code provides: "Aliens who are citizens or sub-
jects of any government which accords to citizens of the United States
the right to prosecute claims against such government in its courts. shall
have the privilege of prosecuting claims against the United States in the
Court of Claims, whereof such court, by reason of their subject matter
and character, might take jurisdiction." 36 STAT. 1139 (1911), 28 U. S. C. A.
§ 261 (1928).
4 Supra note 2, at 36.
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compensation provisions of the requisitioning act would be to render it
unconstitutional in the light of the due process clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment,7 and that the petitioner, as an alien friend, was entitled to the full
benefit of the constitutional privileges.8
The reversal is to be approved, but since the only points considered were
the rights of aliens as such, the political fact of non-recognition will re-
main important on the return of the case to the lower court insofar as
the claimant will be called upon to establish its corporate existence and
the authority of the officers bringing suit.LO Its position is in certain respects
unfavorable in View of the inhospitable attitude of American courts to-
ward the Soviet regime as revealed in past decisions. In New York, for
example, where most of the Russian cases have arisen, the Court of Ap-
peals has denied the Soviet government the right to sue", and has ruled
that its decrees will be considered void beyond its own territory"* unless to
do so would be unjust to our own citizens or to citizens of friendly foreign
states.'-
The cornerstone of this jural structure, a refusal to meddle in political
affairs,13 a desire to avoid opposition between the courts and the executive, 4
is quite sound. Nevertheless, while a too-narrow definition of the political
sphere would be harmful and presumptuous, the uniqueness of the Rus-
sian problem, with business pressing forward insistently'i in spite of the
5Russian Volunteer Fleet v. United States, 51 Sup. Ct. 229 (1931).
6 See note 1 supra.. Cf. International Paper Co. v. United States, 51
Sup. Ct. 176 (1931), noted in (1931) 40 YALE L. J. 992.
7 Cf. Richmond Screw Anchor Co. v. United States, 275 U. S. 331,
48 Sup. Ct. 194 (1928) ; Seaboard Air Line v. United States, 261 U. S. 299,
43 Sup. Ct. 354 (1923).
S Cf. Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U. S. 228, 16 Sup. Ct. 977
(1896).
9 See the brief for the government in its argument before the Supreme
Court, page 13.
10 Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic v. Cibrario, 235 N. Y.
255, 139 N. E. 259 (1923), aff'g 198 App. Div. 869, 191 N.Y. S. 543 (1st
Dep't 1921).
lPetrogradsky Mlejdunarodny Kommerchesky Bank v. National City
Bank of New York, 253 N. Y. 23, 170 N. E. 479 (1930); cf. Russian
Reinsurance Co. v. Stoddard, 240 N.Y. 149, 147 N.E. 703 (1925); Applica-
tion of People by Beha, 229 App. Div. 637, 243 N.Y. S. 35 (1st Dep't
1930). The Soviet government is immune from suit in our courts without
its consent. Wulfsohn v. R.S.F.S.R., 234 N.Y. 372, 138 N.E. 24 (1923);
cf. Nankivel v. Omsk All-Russian Government, 237 N.Y. 150, 142 N.E. 569
(1923); Nicholas Veovodine v. Government of the Commander-in-Chief of
the Armed Forces in the South of Russia, N.Y.L.J., May 23, 1931, at 10.19.
1 2 Fred S. James & Co. v. Second Russian Insurance Co., 239 N.Y.
248, 146 N.E. 369 (1925); see James & Co. v. Russia Ins. Co. of America,
247 N.Y. 262, 160 N.E. 364, (1928).
13 Cf. Kennett v. Chambers, 14 How. 38 (U. S. 1852); Jones v. United
States, 137 U.S. 202, 11 Sup. Ct. 80 (1890).
14]mERvEY, LEGAL EFFECTS OF RECOGNITION, 40, 52. EVANS, CASES ON
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2d ed. 1922), note on recognition, 52, 57.
35During the calendar year 1930, while American foreign trade
dropped 40 per cent below 1929, Russian-American trade increased 29 per
cent. ECONOMic REvmw OF THE SovImr UNION, February 15, 1931, p. 92.
During the fiscal year 1929-30 American exports to Russia amounted to
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Department of State,'( makes it clear that a definition which is too broad
leaves uncontrolled economic forces of vast importance whose regulation
is in every sense the proper work of the judiciary. Where an unrecognized
regime has held power for a long time and shows no signs of immediately
impending collapse the courts may find it necessary to defer to its laws
unless they are to allow their own province to be encroached upon, at least
in litigation to which representatives of the last-recognized government are
not parties.17 Such acceptance of Soviet decrees and laws should clear
the way for recovery by the present claimant without regard to possible
connection with the Soviet government since, as a corporation, it is a dis-
tinct jural entity.18 In this connection it is important that the federal
courts are not yet bound to the New York doctrines. So far they have
determined only that the Soviet government itself may not lay claim to
Russian State property held here by ministers of the vanished Kerensky
republic 19 and that these ministers may sue here in the name of the
Russian State under certain circumstances 20 morever they have conceded
that the Soviet Government is sovereign within its own territory21
While the suggested frontal attack on the whole non-recognition tangle
would seem the most realistic method of handling the present claim, it Is
not impossible to arrive at the same result indirectly. The doctrine of
the nullity of Soviet decrees cuts two ways, and an organization which
existed before the revolution presumably still exists regardless of its treat-
ment at the hands of the new government.' 2 Moreover, it may be that all
examination into this point is precluded by the fact that the Fleet has
appeared and defended in an earlier action brought by the United States,. 3
There is no reason why the authority of the officers may not be authenti-
cated by such Soviet government records as would constitute competent
evidence under normal circumstances of international harmony, since the
127 millions of dollars as compared with 26 millions of dollars for 1912-13.
8 FOREIGN POLICY ASSN. INFORMATION SERVICE, 377 (1930).
6 In connection with the matter of repudiation of debts and confisca-
tion of property it is significant that the Soviet government has announced
counterclaims based on the intervention and blockade, for which the
United States was immediately responsible. These counterclaims might
easily be admitted to be excessive without leaving any balance at all in
favor of the United States. See Schuman, 32 CURENT HISTORY 911 (1930).
- See E. M. Borchard, Comment (1922) 31 YALE L. J. 534; John
Basset Moore, CANDOR AND COMIION SENSE, an address delivered before
the Association of the Bar of the City of New York on Dec. 4, 1930. Cf.
Consul of Spain v. La Conception, No. 3137, 6 Fed. Cas. 359 (C.C.D.S.C,
1819) ; Yrassi v. Clement, 2 C. & P. 223 (1825), 3 Bing, 432, 11 Moo. C.P.
308 (1826).
18 Aff. U.R.S.S. et Dobroflot c. Herzfeld, Cour d'Appel do Paris (1931).
19 The Penza, The Tobolsk, 277 Fed. 91 (D.C.N.Y. 1921); The Rogdai,
278 Fed. 294 (D.C.Cal. 1920).
20 Lehigh Valley Ry. v. State of Russia, 21 F. (2d) 396 (C.C.A. 2d, 1927).
21 Banque de France v. Equitable Trust Co., 33 F. (2d) 202 (D.C.
N.Y. 1929).
22 Petrogradsky M. K. Bank v. National City Brnk, szipra, note 11.
23 United States v. Russian Volunteer Fleet, 22 F. (2d) 187 (D.C.
N.Y. 1927). In James & Co. v. Second Russian Insurance Co., supra note
12, Chief Judge Cardozo said, "A corporation with vitality sufficient to
answer a complaint has, by the very terms of the hypothesis, vitality suffi-
cient to permit it to be sued. The shades of dead defendants do not ans-
wer and plead." Supra note 12, at 254, 146 N.E. at 370.
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New York courts themselves have admitted Soviet documents as official
evidence in making proof of claim.24 The Court of Claims is not so
shackled that it must dismiss the action. Whether it meet its difficulties
directly or indirectly it is free to inquire into the just value of the con-
tracts at the time of appropriation.2 3
PRIOR CONVICTION AS A BAR TO A CIVIL Surr TO COLLECT A PENALTY
THE constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy has recently received,
at the hands of the United States Supreme Court, an interpretation,' which
would seem to contravene the legislative intent to impose heavy penalties
on violators of the Prohibition Act. In a civil suit by the United States
to recover for non-payment of the double "taxes" and the "additional"
penalty of $500 incurred by defendant's liquor sale in violation of section
35 of the National Prohibition Act,2 defendant pleaded in bar his prior
conviction in a criminal prosecution for the same illegal sales. The court
held that since the "tax" clearly involved the idea of punishment for an
infraction of law, the suit for these penalties, notwithstanding that it was
civil in form, amounted to a second punishment for the same acts. The
plea was therefore sustained in order to avoid "a grave question as to
the constitutionality of" the National Prohibition Act.3
The tax upon illegal manufacture and sale under this section is em-
bodied in a penal statute and evidence of a crime is essential to its as-
sessment; it therefore clearly serves the function of a penalty for a crim-
inal offense.4 But a suit to collect statutory penalties, although a punitive
proceeding, at the same time possesses many of the attributes of a civil
24 Werenjchik v. Ulen Contracting Corporation, 229 App. Div. 3G, 240
N. Y. Supp. 619 (3d Dep't 1930). In that case Soviet birth certificates
were accepted to establish the ages and relationship of certain minors in
Russia claiming under the New York Workmen's Compensation Law. The
decision was affirmed in 255 N. Y. 56, 173 N. E. 921 (1930), and though
the affirmance was rested on additional evidence, the holding of the Ap-
pellate Division in this matter seems still to be the law of the case. Some
of this additional evidence, discussed in denying reargument, 255 N. Y.
411, 175 N. E. 112 (1931), seems decidedly questionable. Soviet official evi-
dence is used continually in scores of probate cases in Bronx and New York
Counties. Cf. Matter of Glassman, Sup. Ct. Bronx Co. No. 140 (1919).
25 Compensation was fixed by the Emergency Fleet, at $1,400,000, payable
on determination of the proper payee by the Department of State; the
amount of the claim is $4,000,000.
' United States v. LaFranca, 282 U. S. 568, 51 Sup. Ct. 278 (1931).
241 STAT. 305 (1919), 27 U. S. C. § 52 (1926).
3 On the same day the Court held that a proceeding to forfeit property
used in defrauding the United States of taxes on liquor diverted to bever-
age purposes in violation of the Revenue Act of 1918 was not barred by
the claimant's prior conviction of conspiracy to violate the same act. Water-
loo Distilling Corporation v. United States, 282 U. S. 577, 51 Sup. Ct. 282
(U. S. 1931). The distinction generally made is that while the criminal
prosecution is a proceeding against the person of the defendant, the for-
feiture proceeding is a suit in rcm against the offending property and can-
not place the defendant twice in jeopardy. (1931) 29 Micn. L. REv. 930.
4 Thome v. Lynch, 269 F. 995 (D. Minn. 1921); Liphe v. Lederer, 259
U. S. 557, 42 Sup. Ct. 549 (1922); Regal Drug Corporation v. Wardell,
260 U. S. 386, 43 Sup. Ct. 152 (1922).
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action. The action is one of debt, in which the government sues in its
fiscal capacity, rather than as a prosecutor for an infraction of the law.5
The suit is governed by the rules of evidence and procedure in civil cases,
which would not require proof beyond a reasonable doubt to support the
verdict.L Moreover, depositions may be introduced in evidence, notwith-
standing the Sixth Amendment which would entitle the defendant to be
confronted with the witnesses against him, if the suit were a criminal one."
Nor is the suit so far criminal in its nature as to prevent the direction
of a verdict for the government, when the testimony is undisputed,S or an
order for a new trial where a verdict for the defendant is contrary to the
weight of the evidence.9
On this reasoning in the state courts, the imposition of double and treble
damages as a penalty for cutting timber on public lands of the state, in
addition to a criminal punishment, has been held not to infringe the double
jeopardy provision of a state constitution.10 A conviction for fishing in the
prohibited season, in violation of the game laws, has been held not to put
the defendant twice in jeopardy when he is subsequently sued to recover
the specific penalty for each fish illegally caught." And the lower federal
courts have allowed the collection of an additional penalty for a violation
of liquor laws though the violation was at the same time a misdemeanor,
punishable by fine or imprisonment. Thus it has been held that a debt ac-
tion to collect the penalty does not bar a subsequent indictment for the
offense;- and conversely, that a conviction for the offense does not bar a
subsequent suit to recover the penalty, notwithstanding that the illegal
acts, as in the principal case, were identical.3
5 See Stout v. State, 36 Okla. 744, 748, 130 Pac. 553, 554 (1913) in
which the court advances an interesting historical interpretation of the re-
lation of double jeopardy to suits for penalties. In a review of the de-
velopment of the doctrine at early common law, it points out as a signi-
ficant fact that punishment for felony was accompanied by a destruction
of the defendant's property and its forfeiture to the Xing or overlord; and
that the guarantee against double jeopardy existed side by side with the
provisions for forfeiture of the felon's property. It was customary for the
suit for forfeiture to be brought by officers of the Crown in a subsequent
civil action; so that the recovery of this penalty, being incident to a con-
viction, bore no relation to the doctrine of double jeopardy. This seems
a persuasive argument for the conclusion that suits for penalties are quite
independent of the question of double jeopardy.
6 Stone v. United States, 167 U. S. 178, 17 Sup. Ct. 778 (1897); State
v. Roach, 83 Kan. 606, 112 Pac. 150 (1910); see Murphy v. United States,
272 U. S. 630, 633, 47 Sup. Ct. 218, 219 (1926). But of. Coffey v. United
States, 116 U. S. 436, 443, 6 Sup. Ct. 437, 440 (1886), where the court
failed satisfactorily to answer the argument as to the difference in the
degree of proof.
7 United States v. Zucker, 161 U. S. 475, 16 Sup. Ct. 641 (1896).
S Hepner v. United States, 213 U. S. 103, 29 Sup. Ct. 474 (1909).
9 Pettis v. Dixon, Kirby 179 (Conn. 1786).
10 State v. Shevlin-Carpenter Co., 99 Minn. 158, 108 N.W. 935 (1906).
11 Rollins v. Breed, 54 Hun 485, 8 N. Y. Supp. 48 (Sup. Ct. 4th dep't 1889).
12 United States v. Bullinger, 290 Fed. 395 (E. D. N. Y. 1923); In re
Lyzynsky, Fed. Cas. No. 8279 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1879), following People v.
Stevens, 13 Wend. 341 (N. Y. 1835), which declared that it was within
the power of the legislature to subject one offense to both a penalty and
a criminal prosecution.
13Violefte v. Walsh, 282 Fed. 582 (C. C. A. 9th, 1922), 'ev'd on other
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Moreover, in the principal case, there can be no doubt that Congress in-
tended to make the penalty cumulative.4 The manufacture or sale of
illegal liquor is expressly made a misdemeanor by the National Prohibition
Act, punishable by fine or imprisonment,5 while the subsequent section 10
under which the action in the principal case is brought, imposes "upon
evidence of such illegal manufacture or sale, a tax . . . assessed against,
and collected from, the person responsible for such illegal manufacture or
sale in double the amount now provided by law, with an additional penalty
of $500 on retail dealers, and $1000 on manufacturers. The payment of
such tax or penalty shall ... [not] relieve anyone from criminal liability
.... " Although the penalty is to be collected by a civil action and the fine
or imprisonment enforced by a criminal prosecution, the two punishments
seem to constitute but one complete punishment, 7 so that the enforcement
of either would appear to be no proper bar to a suit for the enforcement
of the other.
grounds in 264 U. S. 568, 44 Sup. Ct. 332 (1924); United States v. It.
Clemens Beverage Co., 23 F. (2d) 885 (D. Mich. 1927). State cases to
the same effect are Blatchley v. Moser & Barkerloo, 15 Wend. 215 (N.Y.
1836) ; Stout v. State, supra note 5. Contra: United States v. McKee, Fed.
Cas. No. 15,688 (C. C. E. D. Mo. 1877), upon which the Court mainly
relies in the principal case.
14 It has been held that defendant's plea of double jeopardy, based upon
an allegation of prior conviction, cannot be sustained, the penalties being
definitely fixed by the National Prohibition Act as cumulative. United
States v. Mlt. Clemens Beverage Co., supra note 13. And the suggestion
has been made that even if defendant were twice in jeopardy for the
same offense, the argument could not prevail against the clear provision in
the Act. United States v. Bullinger, supra note 12, at 396.
15 41 STAT. 305 (1919) 27 U. S. C. § 46 (1926).
le Supra note 2.
17 People v. Stevens; In re Lyzynsky, both supra note 12; Blatehley v.
Moser & Barkerloo, supra note 13; Rollins v. Breed, supra note 11. To
what extent the legislature may proceed in subjecting a defendant to a
criminal prosecution and to an additional civil suit for penalties is as
yet an unsolved problem, closely allied with the question of the state's power
to separate one transaction into several distinct offenses. In Ex parte
Snow, 120 U. S. 274, 7 Sup. Ct. 556 (1887), the defendant's cohabitation
with seven women over a period of three years was held to be a con-
tinuing offense, not divisible into distinct isolated acts. The Court ex-
pressed its fear at the dangers in the possibility of splitting up the three
year period and assessing the punishment for each one-half year, or for
each month, ad infinitum. But in Ebeling v. Morgan, 237 U. S. 625, 35
Sup. Ct. 710 (1915), the Court affirmed a conviction on seven counts, one
for each mail bag that defendant had illegally cut. Ex parte Snow was
distinguished as being an attempt "to cut up a continuous offence into
separate crimes in a manner unwarranted by the statute making the of-
fense punishable." The inference, although highly speculative, to be drawn
from this statement might be that Congress may split one transaction as
far as it deems necessary in the exercise of its police power. Cf. Ex parte
Henry, 123 U. S. 372, 8 Sup. Ct. 142 (1887); Badders v. United States,
240 U. S. 391, 36 Sup. Ct. 367 (1916); Albrecht v. United States, 273 U.
S. 1, 47 Sup. Ct. 250 (1927; Serentino v. United States, 3 F. (2d) 371
(C. C. A. 1st, 1930).
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STOCK OWNERSHIP AS "DOING BUSINESS" FOR PURPOSES OF JURISDICTION
IN passing upon the diverse attempts of states to place the local operations
of foreign corporations on a par with those of domestic corporations courts
have evolved the concept of "doing business" within the state as a com-
mon determinant of constitutionality.1 But the diversity of state regulatory
efforts and the variety of corporate activities within the states have made
a categorical definition of this test well-nigh impossible.2 Moreover con-
fusion has arisen from a judicial failure consistently to recognize that the
question of whether or not a foreign corporation is "doing business" is
determinable only in relation to the purpose for which jurisdiction is as-
serted. Thus in any given factual situation three different problems may
arise, depending on whether the case involves service of process on the
foreign corporation, taxation, or subjection to qualification statutes.3
In a recent case , which involved the interpretation of a Washington
statute requiring a foreign corporation doing business within the state
to file a copy of its charter and appoint a process agent, the Supreme
Court of the state held that a foreign corporation, organized primarily
to hold stock in Washington banks, was doing business within the mean-
ing of this statute solely because of its controlling stock ownership, The
court argued that because under a Washington statute0 only a foreign
corporation doing business within the state could hold stock in domestic
corporations, it followed that if stock is in fact held, the holding corpora-
tion must be doing business within the state, thus overlooking the equally
valid conclusion that the stock might be held illegally.
Entirely apart, however, from this circular reasoning, the decision is
without direct support in precedent. Those cases in which the holding
company has been held to be "doing business" in the state of its subsi-
diary, the majority of which pertain only to the validity of a service
of a process in a particular action, all involve factors of direct activity
within the state in addition to stock ownership even when such ownership
was the express purpose of incorporation.7 In one case the court has
1 See Isaacs, An Analysis of Doing Business (1925) 25 COL. L. Rav.
1018; Cahill, Jurisdiction Over Foreign Corporations (1917) 30 HARV. L.
REv. 676; Bullington, Jurisdiction Over Foreign Corporations (1926) 24
MICH. L. REV. 633; Note (1929) 42 HARV. L. REV. 1063.
2 The Supreme Court has consistently refused to lay down any all-em-
bracing rule on this subject. See Peoples Tobacco Co. Ltd. v. American
Tobacco Co., 246 U. S. 79, 87, 38 Sup. Ct. 233, 235 (1918). See Note (1921)
21 COL. L. REV. 362.
3 See Isaacs, op. cit. supra note 1, at 1024-1026, and cases there cited
for an interesting attempt to show that there are degrees of doing business,
service of process requiring the least degree, taxation a greater, and quali-
fication the greatest. Admitting, as does the author, that most courts pur-
port to deal with the concept irrespective of the purpose, it seems safer
to say that in fact the court faces a different problem depending on the
purpose.
4 Bankers Holding Corporation v. Maybury, U. S. Daily, April 23, 1931
at 448.
C1 WASH. COMP. STAT. (Remington 1922) §§ 3853, 3854.
6 WASH. CoMP. STAT. (Remington, 1922) § 3810.
7 Groel v. United Electric Co., 69 N.J. Eq. 397, 60 Atl. 822 (1905)
(foreign parent corporation had been licensed to do business within New
Jersey and had appointed a process agent there) ; Ideal Theatre v. South-
ern Enterprises, Inc., 132 S. C. 352, 128 S. E. 166 (1925) (foreign parent
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dxpressly repudiated the theory that stock ownership suffices to constitute
"doing business."3 Nor has any case been found sustaining the assumption
of jurisdiction for tax purposes on the bare facts of the instant case.
And among the cases which involve qualification statutes, that most nearly
in point is Colovial Trust Co. v. Monticcllo Brick Works 1) wherein the
court said, "If the alleged doing business . . . consisted simply in its [the
foreign corporation's] purchase of stock ... we would hold that this did
not constitute doing business within the state",1 1 and proceeded to enum-
erate five further factors including a bank account and office within the
state.12 Where stock ownership is the only evidence of activity, the courts
have consistently refused to "pierce the corporate veil" in order to identi-
fy the business of the subsidiary with the business of the parent for
purposes of jurisdiction over the latter.2 But the result of the instant
had paid domestic subsidiary's debts with its own checks and issued
passes for admission to subsidiary's theatre; subsidiary had advertised as
being under the supervision of the foreign corporation).
In State ex rel. New York Oil Co. v. Superior Court of Washington
for Gray's Harbour County, 143 Wash. 641, 255 Pac. 1030 (1927), service
was held validly made on the agent of a domestic subsidiary which was
found to be merely the dummy of foreign parent. Factors: (1) sub-
°sidiary's trustees never held a meeting; (2) subsidiary never filed a list
of officers or appointed a process agent or made any federal income tax
return; (3) the cause of action arose out of local business. The court's
argument: Someone was doing business in Washington; the subsidiary
was not; therefore, the foreign holding company must have been. Cf.
In re San Antonio Land and Irrigation Co., 223 Fed. 984 (S. D. N. Y.
1916) (in receiver's action held that Canadian holding company was doing
business in Texas because by operation of trust doctrine it owned 00,000
acres of land there); Industrial Research Corporation v. General Motors
Corporation, 29 F. (2d) 623 (N. D. Ohio 1928) (patent infringement suit
governed by 36 STAT. 1100, 28 U. S. C. § 109 (1916)).
8 See Ruff v. Manhattan Oil Co. of Delaware, 172 Blinn. 585, 588, 21G N.
W. 331, 332 (1927).
9 That the general rule is clearly against the validity of taxation of a for-
eign corporation predicated solely on stock ownership, see Isaacs, op. cit.
supra note 1, at 1030 and 1037-1040. In Commonwealth v. Wilkes-Barre &
H. R. Co., 251 Pa. 6, 95 Atl. 915 (1915) a tax case strongly relied upon by
the instant court to support the application of the qualification statute, the
court found, in addition to -%tock ownership in domestic subsidiaries as a
"primary purpose," (1) that the parent had a bank account in Pennsyl-
vania and received dividends there, (2) that all directors meetings were
held there, and (3) that the parents' treasurer resided in Pennsylvania,
significant because the statute in question (Pa. Laws (1385) 193] imposed
the duty to pay the tax only on a resident treasurer.
1 (172 Fed. 310 (C. C. A. 3d 1909).
S1Ibid. 311.
12 The other factors were: (1) parent and subsidiary had interlocling
directorates; (2) all directors of the foreign corporation, except the statu-
tory Delaware director, were residents of the subsidiary's state; (3) the
officers were residents; (4) the bonds of the parent were registered and
payabl in the subsidiary's state.
13 In the following cases concerning merely service of process stock
ownership alone was held not to be doing business. Conley v. Mathicson
Alkali Works, 190 U. S. 406, 23 Sup. Ct. 728 (1903); Peterson v. Chicago
R. I. & P. Ry., 205 U. S. 364, 27 Sup. Ct. 513 (1907); Philadelphia &
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case indicates an essentially different approach to the problem of "doing
business," wherein the court finds it unnecessary to look beyond the more
fact of stock ownership. On this basis, it may be argued that the foreign
corporation has consented to the qualifying statute since it is only when
it is "doing business" that it has the privilege of holding stock in Wash-
ington corporations. 14 Although perhaps an unwarranted extension of
the present statutes, the doctrine of the instant case is of great importance
in simplying jurisdictional control of the elusive holding company and per-
haps its greatest significance lies in the field of public utilities.1-
The same result might better be attained by the passage of a statute
embodying the doctrine that the transaction of business through stock
ownership in a corporation is a privilege within the power of the state
to grant or deny,' 6 and conditioning the grant upon consent to the state's
jurisdiction and appointment of a process agent.1" Such a statute should
define with particularity the type and extent of the stock interests to
which it applies. s Moreover, jurisdiction should be limited to causes of
action arising out of the local busin2!ss, or at least some provision should
be made to exclude suits more properly triable elsewhere. 0 So qualified,
Reading Ry. v. McKibben, 243 U. S. 264, 37 Sup. Ct. 280 (1917); Canon
Mfg. Co. v. Cudahy Packing Co., 267 U. S. 333, 45 Sup. Ct. 250 (1925). In
Toledo Traction Light & Power Co. v. Smith, 205 Fed. 643 (N. D. Ohio
1913), it was held that a corporation expressly organized to hold stocks
was not doing business for the purpose of a qualification statute [Oilti
GEN. CODE (Page, 1926) §§ 178, 558) more rigorous than the instant
statute. But see Central Life Securities v. Smith, 236 Fed. 170, 176 (C.
C. A. 7th, 1916) ; Hall v. Woods 325 Ill. 114, 143, 156 N. E. 258, 269 (1927).
14 See statute supra note 6.
15 On the public utility aspect of this problem see in general Lilienthal,
Regldation of Public Utility Holding Conpanies (1929) 29 CoL. L. Rnv.
404, 437. See also New Hampshire Gas and Electric Co. v. Morse, 42 F.
(2d) 490 (D. N. H. 1930) (foreign public utility holding company held not
"present" in the state of its subsidiary so as to be amenable to service
of the New Hampshire Public Utility Commission's subpoena dwcs tecvui).
16 This follows from the familiar rule that corporations are mere crea-
tures of the legislature creating them. Color v. Tacoma R. & Power Co.,
65 N. J. Eq. 347, 54 Atl. 413 (1903) (holding that the Washington rule,
prior to the present statute, supra note 6, that a corporation cannot sub-
scribe for, purchase, hold or vote upon shares of stock of another cor-
poration without legislative consent, not at that time given, applies to'
corporations foreign to that state). Cf. Hall v. Woods, supra note 13,
(foreign corporation with agency and loan powers held unable legally to
bold stock in Illinois ' corporation under that state's statutes).
17 The possibility of this provision being held an "unconstitutional con-
dition" is slight since such a statute would not condition any right or
privilege guaranteed by the Constitution. For a case holding that a state
may totally exclude foreign corporations see Railway Express Agency v.
Virginia, 51 Sup. Ct. 201 (1931), noted in 40 YALE L. J. 1103 (1931).
Is Compare the great particularity with which a controlling interest is
defined in the recently proposed Kansas statute to regulate public utility
holding companies. SENATE BILL 304 reported in U. S. DAILY, March 6,
1931, at 29. See CONYNGTON, CORPORATION ORGANIZATION AND MANAGE-
MENT (1918) 451.
19 See Note (1929) 29 COL. L. REV. 187 (contending that the service cases
may be reconciled for the most part by consideration of where the cause
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the suggested statute would merely facilitate service of process in personal
actions. The present Washington qualification statute requires in addition
the unobjectionable formality of filing the corporate charter; different is-
sues would be raised by more stringent requirements, such as a provision
that the foreign corporation must produce any information demanded -")
or the voiding of all contracts entered into within the state as a penalty
for non-compliance 2 '
ExTRaATERR1TORIAL SUBPOENA OF WITNESSES
MoTVATED largely by the increasing mobility of individuals and the poten-
tial embarrassment to the efficiency of judicial investigation resulting
therefrom, statutes have frequently been passed to circumvent the terri-
torial limitations upon the Courts' common law powers of testimonial com-
pulsion and to make available the testimony of absent witnesses.' Virtually
all the states and Congress have enacted legislation providing for the
taking of depositions beyond the jurisdiction either by specially appointed
commissioners or by foreign courts acting pursuant to letters rogatory.2
Some legislatures have recently sought a more effective means of testimonial
compulsion by authorizing the service of a subpoena upon resident witnesses
to testify in another jurisdiction.3 Since both types of statutes are, how-
of action arose). See also Foster, Place of Trial in Ciril ActionwS (1930)
43 HARv. L. REV. 1217, for an excellent discussion of the entire problem.
20 This might be a very desirable provision. For the view, however, that
states purposely harass the foreign corporation, see Isaacs, op. cit. eapra
note 1, at 1018-1020.
21 In the absence of such a statute as herein suggested a decision on one
type of qualifying statute should not be considered controlling as to an-
other type. Therefore the decision in Toledo Traction Light and Power
Co. v. Smith, supra note 13, that the foreign corporation was not doing
business -within the Ohio qualification statutes is not cotra, to the instant
case, since there a fiiding of doing business would have resulted in de-
priving the holding company of voting rights to the detriment of the sub-
sidiary.
I That a court has no power to compel the attendance of one who is out-
side its jurisdiction see Fidelity and Casualty Co. v. Johnson, 72 Miss.
333, 17 So. 2 (1895); State v. Murphy, 48 S. C. 1, 25 S. E. 43 (1896)
(witness in another state); Patchin v. Davis, 10 U. C. Q. B. 639 (1873)
(witness in foreign country). Federal courts have power to compel the
attendance of a witness resident within 100 miles of the place of trial
although outside the district. Driskill v. Parish, 7 Fed. Cas. No. 4,075 (U. S.
C. C. 7th 1851); Gustine v. Ringgold, 11 Fed. Cas. No. 5,877, (U. S. C. C.
D. C. 1831).
2 The federal statutes provide for both types of procedure. 19 STAT. 241
(1877), 28 U. S. C. § 653 (1926); REV. STAT. § 868 (1878), 28 U. S. C.
§ 646 (1926). State statutes, however, generally provide only for the
taking of depositions by commissioners. For a comprehensive list of these
statutes see Note (1929) 43 HARv. L. REV. 121.
3 Witness "extradition" statutes have been adopted in 10 states. IND.
AcTs 1927, c. 132, § 13; LA. AcTs 1928, No. 71, § 1; Mss. GEN. LAWS
(1921) c. 23:3, § 12; IE. REV. STAT. (1930) c. 144, § 13; N. H. Puu. IAWs
(1926) c. 336 §§ 16-17; N. Y. LAWs (1926), c. 415; R. I. GEN. LiWS (1923)
§§ 5000-01; S. D. CoiMP. LAWs 1929, § 5005; NT. GEN. LAWS (1917)
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ever, based upon the traditional theory that the court's power of compulsion
over the witness is derived from his presence within its jurisdiction, the
domestic court desiring the testimony of an absent witness is forced to
rely on the comity of a foreign tribunal to secure its production.
The public scandal created by the refusal of two Americans to return
from France to testify for the government in a civil suit arising out of
the Teapot Dome oil lease investigation led to the enactment by Congress
in 1926 of the Walsh Act, which embodied the novelty of predicating testi-
monial duty on citizenship and domicile as a basis for authorizing the ser-
vice of an extraterritorial subpoena by a United States consul and pro-
ceeding against the local property of an absent and contumacious witness.
4
Under this statute one of the recusants in the civil suit, after having
been subpoenaed by the United States consul at Paris, was fined $60,000
for a similar failure to appear as a witness in the criminal trials of Sin-
clair and Fall in 1927 and 1928 for conspiracy to defraud the government. '
In sustaining the constitutionality of the statute, the recent decision of
the District of Columbia Court of Appeals would seem to indicate that the
way is open to general adoption of this expedient as an effective instru-
ment for the production of testimony under like circumstances.0
The duty of obedience to law, implicit in the allegiance owed by every
citizen to the state, involves a personal relationship which does not termi-
nate upon residence abroad, but operates to give extraterritorial effect pro
tanto to those laws which are applicable to a citizen living in a foreign
country.7 Upon this ground the court in the Blackmer case found that there
was sufficient personal jurisdiction over the witness to authorize the ser-
vice abroad of an extraterritorial subpoena ordering him to do an affirma-
tive act under penalty of fine. This provision of the statute might have
been supported on the basis of the state's inherent power to recall its
§§- 2558-59; Wis. STAT. (1927) § 326:25. See Medalie, Interstate Exohango
of Witnesses in Criminal Cases THE PANEL, MARCH, 1929, at 1. Note (1911)
25 HARV. L. REV. 188; Note (1911) 11 CoL. L. REy. 786.
4 44 STAT. 835 (1927) ; 28 U. S. C. §§ 711-718 (1927). The maximum fine
of $100,000 for contumacy, to be satisfied out of the sequestered property
of the witness, gives the statue genuine coercive force and takes account
of the fact that only a person of wealth can afford to defy the government
and the courts by living permanently abroad.
z United States v. Blackmer, District of Columbia Supreme Court, re-
ported in U. S. DMLY Mar. 24, 1928, at 196.
6 Blackmer v. U. S., Decided April 6, 1931. New York has already
adopted a statute similar to the federal act in all respects, except that it
is restricted to witnesses whose testimony is desired before the legislature
or any committee thereof. N. Y. LAws 1928, c. 643, N. Y. C. P. A. § 406
(a). State imitation of the federal statute has been urged as a possible dis-
advantage, (1929) 9 B. U. L. REV. 143, but, provided such state en-
actments are constitutional, they would seem to be a means of strengthen-
ing state enforcement machinery. The pending legislative investigation
of the New York City municipal administration may furnish an occasion
for a decision on the constitutionality of the New York law.
7 Cook v. Tait, 265 U. S. 47, 44 Sup. CL 444 (1924) '(tak on income
derived from property located abroad); U. S. v. Bowman, 260 U. S. 94,
43 Sup. Ct. 39 (1922) (conviction for conspiracy to defraud U. S. gov-
ernment consummated in Brazil); CoNFLicT OF LAws RESTATEMENT (Am.




citizens from abroad,8 a power which at common law was exercised at the
will of the sovereign through the prerogative writ of return,9 and which
today is generally invoked only in times of national emergency, notably
as a means of conscripting the army in anticipation of war.,) Under this
reasoning the subpoena would serve merely to inform the citizen that his
testimony is desired at home.', Personal service is obligatory in any case
since otherwise there can be no crime of contempt, but jurisdiction over
the person of the witness is not, strictly speaking, a prerequisite to the
service of a subpoena abroad t=
Moreover, sequestration of the property of a contumacious witness simul-
taneously with substituted service of an order to show cause and subse-
quent proceedings to judgment in his absence, provide a method of com-
pulsion which does not violate the principle that legislation, though bind-
ing, can not be enforced extraterritorially. 3 Since there is no personal
judgment to be satisfied otherwise than out of the sequestered property,13
the procedure is analagous to a quasi in rem proceeding upon substituted
judgment to be satisfied otherwise than out of the sequestered property,14
Contempt proceedings are not surrounded with all the constitutional safe-
guards that protect the accused in a criminal trial and due process is satis-
fied if there is adequate notice.10 The claim of unconstitutionality on the
8 This line of argument was stressed in the government's brief (pp. 29-
37) but noticed only incidentally at the close of the court's opinion.
9 Bartue and Duchess of Suffolk's Case, 2 Dyer [K. B.] 176 b (1559);
Knowles v. Luce, Moore [K. B.] 109 (1579); PIGGOTT, op. cit. supra note
7, vol. I at 2, vol II at 6.
10 Jacobson v. Mass., 197 U. S. 11, 29, 25 Sup. Ct. 358, 362 (1904);
BORCHARD, DIPLoAATIc PROTECTION OF CITIZENS ABROAD (1922) 21; BLUNT-
SCHLI, DRoIT INTERNATIONAL CODIFIE (Lardy's 5th ed., Paris, 1895) § 375;
BONFILS, MANUEL DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC, (Fauchille, Gth ed.) §
433;
1 This would eliminate the possible objection that the service of the
subpoena by the United States consul involves the performance of functions
not authorized by his exequatur and therefore in derogation of the foreign
sovereignty.
- It is doubtful whether the same principles can be postulated of state
citizenship, though it has been said that a citizen of a state owes a similar
allegiance. MILLER, CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (1891) 2941. At-
tempted recall of an alien witness domiciled in the United States but tem-
porarily resident abroad might easily lead to international complications
which would defeat the purpose of the federal statute in so far as it is
based on the domicile of the witness. Comment (1927) 27 COL. L. REv.
206.
'13 For an elaboration of this principle, see II PIGGOTT, Op. cit. mtpra note
7, at 6, and BORCHARD, op. cit. svpra note 10, at 8.
14 See. 5 of the Act provides that the sequestered property is "to be held
to satisfy any judgment that may be rendered against such witness in the
proceeding so instituted."
'1 See Beale, Juvisdiction in Ren to Compel Payment of a Debt (1913)
27 HARe. L. REV. 107. Jurisdiction to render judgment is derived from
jurisdiction over the res itself. Hitherto Congress has not authorized quasi
in rem proceedings in the federal courts. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714
(1877). But there is no question of its power to do so. See Big Vein Coal
Co. v. Read, 229 U. S. 31, 38, 33 Sup. Ct. 694, 696 (1913).
16 Cooke v. U. S., 267 U. S. 517, 45 Sup. Ct. 390 (1925); Myers v. U.
S., 264 U. S. 95, 44 Sup. Ct. 272 (1924).
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ground that personal judgment against the witness may be rendered in
his absence is therefore without merit in view of detailed provisions in the
Act for notification at every stage of the proceedings.17 Moreover, the
use by the Attorney-General of this potent weapon is to some extent lim-
ited by making it expressly subject to the discretion of the trial court.
That this discretion was wisely used in the instant case is beyond question.
Nevertheless, any affirmance of the instant decision might well emphasize
the necessity of reasonable grounds for the exercise of this coercive power.
CONTRIBUTORY INFRINGEMENT IN PATENT LITIGATION*
DECISIONS of Federal Courts defining the limits of protection afforded a
patentee beyond the exclusive privilege of initial sale have been compounded
of an effort on the one hand to satisfy the purpose of the patent statutes
and on the other to prevent the imposition of oppressive restrictions upon
the use of the patented article by purchasers. The courts early recognized
that it is desirable for the purchaser of a patented article to be able
freely to replace its perishable elements.' Moreover, attempts by "tying
clauses" to control the sale of unpatented supplies used in the operation of
a patented machine or to fix the resale price of a patented article have
finally been invalidated as dangerous restrictions upon freedom of com-
petition and beyond the scope of the patent monopoly.2 On the other hand,
for the proper protection of the patentee, courts have never hesitated to
17 The wording of the Act does not make it clear whether the order to
show cause must be served both personally and by publication, or alter-
natively in the latter way if the former prove inconvenient. The Now
York statute, supra note 6, expressly authorizes the alternative procedure.
*For a more detailed discussion of this problem, see McCormack, Restric-
tive Patent Licenses and Restraint of T'ade (1931) 31 CoL. L. REv. 743.
' Wilson v. Simpson, 9 How. 109, 123 (U. S. 1850). See also Pyle Na-
tional Co. v. Oliver Electric Mfg. Co., 281 Fed. 632, 635 (C. C. A. 8th, 1922),
suggesting the desirability of freedom of competition in the sale of repair
parts.
2 "Tying clauses" in which the patentee notified the purchaser that the
device was sold upon the condition that it be used only with supplies sold
or licensed by the patentee, or that it was sold subject to restrictions upon
resale price determined by the patentee met with temporary success follow-
ing the decision in Heaton-Peninsula Button-Fastener Co. v. Eureka Spec-
ialty Co., 77 Fed. 288 (C. C. A. 6th, 1896). Restrictive notices as to use
were held valid in Crown Cork & Seal Co. v. Brooklyn Bottle Stopper Co.,
172 Fed. 225 (C. C. E. D. N. Y., 1909); Henry v. A. B. Dick Co., 224
U. S. 1, 32 Sup. Ct. 364 (1912); and as to resale price in Victor Talking
Machine Co. v. The Fair, 123 Fed. 424 (C. C. A. 7th, 1903); contra: Wal-
tham Watch Co. v. Keene, 202 Fed. 225 (S. ]D. N. Y., 1913). These at-
tempts were, however, finally thwarted by divided courts. Motion Picture
Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U. S. 502, 37 Sup. Ct. 416
(1917) (attempt of a patentee of a motion picture projection machine to
restrict its use solely to unpatented films licensed by it) ; Bauer v. O'Don-
nell, 229 U. S. 1, 33 Sup. Ct. 616 (1913) (resale price clause held invalid);
cf. United States v. General Electric Company, 272 U. S. 476, 47 Sup. Ct.
192 (1926), (control of sale price through agency agreements with dealers
held valid); Klaus, Sale, Agency and Price Maintenance (1928) 28 COL.
L. REv. 312, 441; Comment (1931) 40 YALE L. J. 954. See VAUGHAN, ECO-
NOMICS OF OUR PATENT SYSTEM, (1925) 125-127, 145.
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enjoin as an immediate infringement substantial reconstruction of the
patented device by the purchaser.3 Yet, since a purchaser's infringement
is usually limited to the reconstruction of but a few articles, such a remedy,
necessitating multitudinous suits for negligible damages in each, is hardly
effective. Accordingly, under a theory of contributory infringement, the
patentee has been allowed to proceed directly against any manufacturer or
vendor of elements clearly designed for use in a patented process 4 or in
the making or reconstruction of a patented combination.5 But unless this
doctrine is limited in its application to the supply of integral elements
with a life span not materially shorter than that of the patented device
itself, it would tend to destroy the purchaser's privilege to replace quickly
depreciable and unpatented elements of a patented combination., Therefore,
for the purpose of adequately protecting the patentee against reconstruc-
tion and yet preserving the purchaser's rights to repair and use, a working
distinction, first formulated in Leeds & Catlin Company v. Victor Talking
Machine Cow panyj has been drawn between products upon which the ma-
chine operates and which must be renewed periodically whenever it is put
to use, and those elements which, although renewable periodically, actively
cooperate with the remaining elements of the machine in the performance
of its functions; and the interdict of contributory infringement has been
limited to the supply of elements in the latter class. On this basis the
Court in the Leeds & Catlin case in justifying its injunction against
the sale of records to be used in a patented combination of record and
phonograph, although the patentee had no patent on the record alone, dis-
3 American Cotton Tie Co. v. Simmons, 106 U. S. 89, 1 Sup. Ct. 52 (1882)
(defendants made and sold complete cotton bale ties, purchasing used pat-
ented buckle and band and replacing the band); Davis Electrical Worhs v.
Edison Electric Light Co., 60 Fed. 276 (C. C. A. 1st, 1894) (defendants
replaced burned carbon filaments in Edison electric lamps); George Close
Co. v. Ideal Wrapping Machine Co., 29 F. (2d) 533 (C. C. A. 1st, 1928)
(defendant's reconstruction of patented candy cutting and wrapping ma-
chine resulted in a more attractive product which injured trade in product
of other machines).
4Leew Filter Co. v. German-American Filter Co., 107 Fed. 949 (C. C.
A. 6th, 1901); Electro Bleaching Gas Co. v. Paradon Engineering Co.,
12 F. (2d) 511 (C. C. A. 2d, 1926).
3 Thomson-Houston Electric Co. v. Ohio Brass Co., 80 Fed. 712 (C. C.
A. 6th, 1897); Westinghouse Electric & Manufacturing Co., v. Precize
Manufacturing Corp., 11 F. (2d) 209 (C. C. A. 2d, 1926). Contributory
infringement, however, does not extend to the supply of products which
are susceptible of other uses as well as in the patented invention. Robbins
v. Aurora Watch Co., 43 Fed. 521 (C. C. N.D. Il. 1890); Miller v. Electro
Bleaching Gas Co., 276 Fed. 379 (C. C. A. 8th, 1921). In such cases, un-
less the design of the element itself raises the inference that it was in-
tended for infringing uses, see Thomson-Houston Electric Co. v. Ohio Bra~s
Co., supra note 6, at 723; Lyman Manufacturing Co. v. Bassic Manu-
facturing Co., 18 F. (2d) 29, 38 (C. C. A. 6th, 1927), the patentee must
show knowledge or intent that the element was sold to be so used. Cortelyou
v. Johnson, 207 U. S. 196, 28 Sup. Ct. 105 (1907); ef. Westinghouse
Electric & Manufacturing Co. v. Simms Magneto Co., 286 Fed. 558 (D. N.
J. 1922).
6 Morgan Gardner Electric Co. v. Buettner & Shelburne Machine Co.,
203 Fed 490 (C. C. A. 7th, 1913); Slocomb & Co. v. Layman Machine Co.,
227 Fed. 94 (D. Del. 1915)-.
7 213 U. S. 325, 29 Sup. Ct. 503 (1909).
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tinguished its previous decision in Morgan Envelope Company v. Albany
Paper Companys permitting the sale of rolls of paper for use with a pat-
ented toilet fixture, even though the patent in the latter case may have
covered the combination of paper and fixture.9 The whimsical and subjec-
tive character of the distinction is indicated by its use in permitting the
supply of a paper registering dial used in a patented watchman's time clock
and renewable every twenty-four hours,10 while prohibiting the supply of
stencil cards made of cardboard and used with a patented addressing ma-
chine." Its adaptability, however, was eventually recognized, 12 and it has
since served as the verbal mould into which has been poured judicial in-
tuition seeking to adjust in individual cases the patentees' clamor for
monopoly and the public interest in the free supply of unpatented elements
of patented combinations.' 3 Hitherto the advantage has been with the
patentees.
In the recent case of Carbice Corporation of American v. Ame-rican
Patents Development Corporation,' a patent claim for a refrigerating ap-
paratus comprehended a combination of frozen carbon dioxide, the food-
stuff to be preserved and an insulated container. The novelty of the struc-
8152 U. S. 425, 14 Sup. Ct. 627 (1894).
9 "To confound its active co-operation [in the combination] with the
mere passivity of the paper in the mechanism described in the Morgan
Envelope Company case is not only to confound essential distinctions made
by the patent laws, but essential distinctions between entirely different
things." Leeds & Catlin Co. v. Victor Talking Machine Co., supra note 8,
at 335, 29 Sup. Ct. at 506. It may also have been the purpose of the
Court to protect the Victor Company from unfavorable consumer reaction
caused by the sale of cheaply made, inferior records for use in its machines.
10 Williams v. Barnes, 234 Fed. 339 (C. C. A. 7th, 1916).
"'Belknap v. Wallace Addressing Machine Co., 12 F. (2d) 597 (C. C. A.
2d, 1926).
12 See Wilson v. Union Tool Co. 265 Fed. 669, (C. C. A. 9th, 1920), ajJ'd,
259 U. S. 107, 42 Sup. Ct. 427 (1922). In Duplicator Manufacturing Co. v.
Heyer, 284 Fed. 242 (C. C. A. 7th, 1922), upon the authority of the Leeds
& Catlin case, supplying gelatinous duplicating bands which were used in a
patented multicopying machine and which were worn out after yielding
about one hundred copies was held to be contributory infringement. This
decision was reversed by the Supreme Court in Heyer v. Duplicator Manu-
facturing Co., 263 U. S. 100, 44 Sup. Pt. 31 (1923), but in a later suit
between the same parties the furnishing of the spool on which the gelatin-
ous duplicating band was wound was enjoined. Heyer Duplicator Co. v.
Ditto (sic), 6 F. (2d) 578 (C. C. A. 7th, 1925). But of. Wagner Type-
writer Co. v. F. S. Webster Co., 144 Fed. 405 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1906)
(not contributory infringement to supply both ribbon and spool of a
pattented typewriting machine) It now seems that the practical and
logical difficulty of speaking in terms of a purchaser's privilege to repair
when dealing with litigation which is almost exclusively concerned with
the problem of contributory infringement, see Bassick Manufacturing Co.
Ready Auto Supply Co., 22 F. (2d) 331, 340, 341 (E. D. N. Y., 1927),
has led the lower courts to rely on the distinction made in the Leeds &
Catlin case to dispose of specific questions of contributory infringement.
See cases cited supra notes 11 and 12.
13 Cf. Hutcheson, The Judgment Intuitive: The Function of the "Hunch"
in Judicial Decision (1929) 14 CORN. L. Q. 274, at 280, 283, 284; FIANK-
FURTER AND LANDIS, BUSINESS OF THE SUPRElME COURT (1927) 176-184.
- 51 Sup. Ct. 334 (1931).
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ture consisted in placing the carbon dioxide in the midst of the foodstuff
to be refrigerated, thereby obtaining additional insulation for the refriger-
ant.15 The defendant had sold carbon dioxide of its own manufacture with
knowledge that it was to be used in assembling packages of the type
covered by the plaintiff's patent. The plaintiff sued to enjoin such sales
upon the ground that they were contributory to the infringement resulting
from the construction of the packages.'0 The decision of the District Court
denying the injunction,17 reversed by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit,' s has now been reinstated by the Supreme Court.
Although the case might well have been disposed of solely on the issue
of patentability,'" which in fact was the major basis of the Circuit Court's
disposition of the controversy, the Supreme Court, nevertheless, assumed
patentability and based its decision upon the right to supply unpatented
materials used in the operation of a patented device. The frozen carbon
dioxide in the instant case seems to be as integral and dynamic a part of
the patented combination as the talking machine record in the Leeds and
Catlin case, but the distinction drawn in that case between passive and
dynamic elements was dismissed as being "without legal significance.
2 0
These facts, taken in conjunction with the recent marked increase in the
number of Supreme Court cases decided adversely to the claims of patent-
ees,2 ' seem to foreshadow a limitation upon the protection afforded paten-
tees by the doctrine of contributory infringement.
RETROACTIVE OPERATION OF DEATH TAXES ON TRANSFPS IN TnuST
THE Supreme Court of the United States has recently held unconstitutional
the application of a Massachusetts succession tax statute I to an antece-
dent irrevocable transfer in trust under the terms of which the settlors,
who died after the enactment of the statute, reserved to themselves and
the survivor of them the income for life.- The decision, which reversed
15 It was this peculiar arrangement which had rendered practicable the
commercial use of solid carbon dioxide as a refrigerant although its cost
was ten times that of ice. The sales of plaintiff's licensee had increascd
from 366, 855 lbs. in ten months beginning March, 1925, to 3,412 031 lbs.
in the year 1927, TRANSCRIPT OF RECORD, p. 19.
16 Brief for Respondents, p. 29.
'7 25 F. (2d) 730 (E. D. N. Y., (1928).
18 38 F. (2d) 62 (C. C. A. 2d, 1930).
19 On a rehearing limited to the question of patentability, the patent
was held invalid. U. S. DAiLY, May 19, 19"1, at 662. This decision is
hardly surprising in the light of the restricted definition of the term manu-
facture for patent purposes recently adopted in American Fruit Growers v.
Brogdex Co., 51 Sup. Ct. 328 (1931).
2 oSupra note 14, at 336.
21 Nine patent opinions have already been rendered during the present
term, all but one of which have been decided adversely to the patentees,
with an additional case ready for argument, De Forest Radio Co. v. General
Electric Co. (No. 630), while during the entire preceding five years but
fourteen opinions were handed down, eight of them adverse to the claimants.
'IMASS. GEN. LAWS (1921) c. 65, § 1: "All property within the jurisdic-
tion . .. which shall pass by .... deed, grant or gift ..... made or in-
tended to take effect in possession or enjoyment after his death ... to any
person absolutely or in trust ... shall be subject to a tax.
2 Coolidge v. Long, 51 Sup. Ct. 306 (U. S. 1931). The trust was created
in 1907. The court attached no significance to the fact that in 1917 the
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the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts 3 and from which four jus-
tices dissented,4 proceeded on the theory that the interests of the bene-
ficiaries "vested" and the act of succession was complete when the trust
was created.' The attempt of the state by subsequent legislation to impose
a tax upon the coming into actual possession and enjoyment of remainders
already vested in interest was held to be a violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Although mere retroactivity does not necessarily invalidate a tax,r the
Supreme Court has intimated that a tax may be so palpably arbitrary and
capricious as to infringe the Fifth, Amendment if levied by the Congress,0
or to offend the Fourteenth Amendment if assessed by a state.' It has
been suggested that the very nature of a succession tax-an excise on the
privilege of receiving a certain transfer-prohibits retrospective operation, s
and perhaps a majority of the state courts incline to this view on facts
similar to those of the instant case.9 But where, in addition to a life
settlers assigned their life interest to the original beneficiaries. The effect
of the instruments of 1907 and 1917 was a completq, divesting of the
settlers' interest in the trust property, but the trustees retained control
and the distribution of the corpus could not be had until the death of the
settlers. Coolidge v. Loring, 235 Mass. 220, 126 N. E. 276 (1920) (suit
by the beneficiaries to reform the trust so as to provide for distribution in
the event of an assignment like that of 1917). This same trust was before
the Supreme Court in the case of Nichols v. Coolidge, 274 U. S. 531, 47 Sup.
Ct. 710 (1927) where it was held that the Federal Estate Tax Act of 1919
was unconstitutional insofar as it was intended to apply to a trust created
before its enactment.
3 Coolidge v. Commissioner, 167 N. E. 757 (Mass. 1929), noted in (1930)
39 YALE L. J. 588.
4 Justices Roberts, Holmes, Brandeis and Stone.
5 Kentucky Union v. Kentucky, 219 U. S. 140, 31 Sup. Ct. 171 (1911).
6 Nichols v. Coolidge, suln'a note 1; See Barclay v. Edwards, 267 U. S.
442, 450, 45 Sup. Ct. 348, 349 (1925); Brushaber v. Union Pacific R. I.,
240 U. S. 1, 24, 36 Sup. Ct. 236, 244 (1916). But see White, C. J., in
Billings v. United States, 232 U. S. 261, 282, 34 Sup. Ct. 421, 424 (1914):
1.... the authority to tax which is given in express terms is not limited or
restricted by the subsequent provisions of the Constitution or the amend-
ments thereto, especially by the due process clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment."
7Schlesinger v. Wisconsin, 270 U. S. 230, 46 Sup. Ct. 260 (1926).
ordinarily if an act of Congress is valid under the Fifth Amendment it
would be hard to say that a state law in like terms was void under the
Fourteenth." Holmes, J., in Calroll v. Greenwich Insurance Co., 199 U. S.
401, 410, 26 Sup. Ct. 66, 67 (1905).
8 Amberg, Retroactive Excise Legislation (1924) 37 HARV. LAW RIv. 691,
694 et seq. Cf. Hirschberg, P. J., in Matter of Craig, 97 App. Div. 289, 296,
89 N. Y. Supp. 971, 975 (2d Dep't 1904): "The underlying principle which
supports the tax is that such right [of succession] is not a natural one, but
is in fact a privilege only, and that the authority conferring the privilege
may impose conditions upon its exercise. But when the privilege has
ripened into a right it is too late to impose conditions of the character in
question, and when the right is conferred by a lawfully executed grant or
contract it is property, and not a privilege, and as such is protected from
legislative encroachment by constitutional guaranties."
9 Cf. Matter of Pell, 171 N. Y. 48, 63 N. E. 789 (1902); Lacey v. State
Treasurer, 152 Iowa 477, 132 N. W. 843 (1911); Hunt v. Wicht, 174 Cal.
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estate, the donor reserves a power of revocation, the transfer is deemed to
be testamentary in effect, and the courts with substantial unanimity hold
that the law in force at the death of the donor controls the taxation of
such a transfer.'l And in a few jurisdictions the privilege of succeeding
to the actual possession and enjoyment of trust property is held to be the
legitimate object of a succession tax even though the interest of the bene-
ficiary technically vested prior to the taxing law.11
Moreover, in analogous cases the Supreme Court itself has sustained
excise tax provisions having retroactive features. A Louisiana successioh
tax statute, for example, was held applicable to distributees of a de-
cedent whose death occurred prior to the effective date of the statute but
whose estate was still undistributed,2- and in an earlier case 13 a New
York statute was given a similar application. Although the rights of the
distributees vested by law at the moment of death, the imposition of the
tax at the moment of distribution was considered not unconstitutional.
The question has also arisen with reference to state statutes imposing a
tax on the exercise of powers of appointment, and the Court has held tax-
able the exercise after the passage of the statute of a power theretofore
created.14 And in other cases '3 it is clear that the Court sees nothing
inherently objectionable in an excise which compels retrospective opera-
tion. It appears that the question of retroactivity depends upon the court's
view of what is being taxed-the vesting in interest, or the transfer of
enjoyment-and it was precisely this difference in viewpoint which divided
the court in the instant ease.
The power of a state to select the incidence of succession duties ought
not to be curtailed by reference merely to the somewhat artificial dis-
tinctions of the law of future interests.'0 In the recent case of Salton-
205, 162 Pac. 639 (1917); Commonwealth v. Wellford, 114 Va. 372, 76
S. E. 917 (1913).
10 Matter of Schmidlapp, 2:36 N. Y. 278, 140 N. E. 697 (1923); Riley
v. Howard, 193 Cal. 522, 226 Pac. 393 (1924); Rottschaefer, Ta..:ation of
Transfers Intended to take Effcct in Possession and Enjoymcnt at Grantor's
Death (1930) 1-4 MINN. LAW R.v. 453, 613.
"In re Wallace's Estate, 282 Pac. 760 (Ore. 1929); Coolidge v. Com-
missioner, supra note 3; Rottschaefer, op. cit. supra note 10, at 623-25.
Cf. Saltonstall v. Treasurer & Receiver General, 256 Mass. 519, 153 N. E.
4 (1926) (Rugg, C. J., said: "Since the excise may be levied on the com-
modity known as succession, it may validly be imposed so long as any
part of that commodity remains in existence") aff'd in Saltonstall V. Sal-
tonstall, 276 U. S. 260, 48 Sup. Ct. 225 (1928).
n Cahen v. Brewster, 203 U. S. 543, 27 Sup. Ct. 174 (1906).
13 United States v. Perkins, 163 U. S. 625, 16 Sup. Ct. 1070' (1896).
14 Orr v. Gilman, 183 U. S. 278, 22 Sup. Ct. 213 (1902) ; Chanler v. Kel-
sey, 205 U. S. 466, 27 Sup. Ct. 550 (1907).
:L5 Stockdale v. The Insurance Co., 20 Wall. 323 (U. S. 1873) ; Billings v.
United States, supra note 6; Milliken v. United States, 51 Sup. Ct. 324
(U. S. 1931).
1 6"Taxation is eminently practical, . . .and for the purpose of deciding
upon its validity a tax should be regarded in its actual, practical results,
rather than with reference to . . . theoretical or abAract ideas... ." Peck-
ham, J., in Nicol v. Ames, 173 U. S. 509, 516, 19 Sup. Ct. 522, 525 (1899).
That it is not irrational for courts to regard a cestui's interest as vesting
for some purposes, for example, to satisfy the requirements of the rule
against perpetuities, but not for purposes of taxation, see Comment (1929)
38 YALE L. J. 657, 659.
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stall v. Saltonstall,17 the Supreme Court held that the very laws of Massa-
chusetts in question in the instant case were constitutional as applied to
an antecedent trust where, in addition to a life interest, the settler re-
served the power to alter or revoke the trust with the consent of one trustee.
The test of constitutionality is there stated to be the incidence of the tax
on "the shifting of the economic benefits and burdens of property," and
not on the technical vesting of the beneficiary's estate.18 The instant case
is scarcely reconcilable with this principle. Succession to actual possession
and enjoyment seems to constitute a transfer of economic interests in
property upon which a state may properly levy a tax, and on this theory
there was no retroactive application of the statute in the instant case,
Nor is a tax on the beneficiaries an arbitrary exaction where the interests
in the trust property which are withheld and to which they succeed after
the statute has taken effect sustain any reasonable relation to the subject
of the tax.19 It is submitted that the use of the Fourteenth Amendment
in the instant case imposes a wholly unwarranted restriction on the tax.
ing power of a sovereign state.
20
1
7 Supra note 11.
Is This principle has also been used by the court in construing the pro-
visions of the Federal Estate Tax. Cf. Reinecke v. Northern Trust Co., 278
U. S. 339, 49 Sup. Ct. 123 (1929); Chase National Bank v. United States,
278 U. S. 327, 49 Sup. Ct. 126 (1929); Tyler v. United States, 281 U. S.
497, 50 Sup. Ct. 356 (1930). See notes (1929) 39 YAtn L. J. 136; (1929) 29
COL. LAW REV.-533; (1929) 41 HARv. L. REV. 916.
29 The dissimilarity which might exist between the value of the property
at the time of the transfer in trust and its value at the time of the set-
tlor's death has influenced several federal courts refusing on constitutional
grounds to impose an estate tax on trusts created before the statute. Frew
v. Bowers, 12 Fed. (2d) 625 (C. C. A. 2d, 1926); Hill v. Nichols, 18 Fed.
(2d) 139 (D. Mass. 1927). But this consideration has no application
where the tax is allowed on the beneficiaries who succeed to the benefits
of the increased value of the property. See Curley v. Tait, 276 Fed. 840,
844 (D. Md. 1921); Frew v. Bowers, supra, at 629.
20 Following the recent case of Burnet v. Northern Trust Co., 51 Sup,
Ct. 105 (U. S. 1931) (memorandum decision) aff'g 41 Fed. (2d) 732 (C.
C. A. 7th, 1930) holding that a transfer by irrevocable deed of trust re-
serving the income to the settler for life was not taxable as a transfer
"intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after death"
within the meaning of the Federal Estate Tax laws, an amendment was
passed during the last session of Congress specifically providing that the
value of property transferred by a decedent in trust or othervike should be
included in his gross estate where "the transferor has retained for his life
or any period not ending before his death (1) the possession or enjoyment
of, or.the income from, the property or (2) the right to designate the
persons who shall possess or enjoy the property or the income therefrom."
The Coolidge case would seem to indicate that this amendment may not
be applied to transfers made prior to its enactment. On the other hand
it is possible to argue that since the amendment is an adjunct of a well
established scheme of taxation, and particularly since it embraces trans-
fers which the Treasury Department has consistently asserted were covered
by existing provisions, its application to antecedent transfers will be up-
held. See Milliken v. United States, supra note 15 at 327 (transfers made
in contemplation of death while the Act of 1916 was in force were held
subject to the higher rates provided by the Act of 1918 where the decedent
died after the effective date of that law).
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